Fake News About Executions for Watching “Squid Game” in North Korea: What the Fact-Check Revealed

In February 2026, a number of media outlets reported on the execution of teenagers in the DPRK for watching the series “Squid Game.” An Amnesty International report was cited as the source. Indeed, North Korea remains one of the most closed countries in the world, making independent verification of internal events difficult. However, an analysis of the report’s content reveals a crucial detail regarding the timeline of the data provided. More on this below.

When the Calendar Contradicts the Report

The news from February 4, 2026, about the execution of schoolchildren for watching the Netflix hit instantly went viral. The message spread rapidly across media and social networks. The wording of the publications emphasized the stark contrast between the popular series and reports of brutal punishments.

However, if one sets aside emotions and opens the text of the actual report—rather than its tabloid retellings — a key question arises regarding the chronology of the described events. Amnesty International honestly states in its methodology that their data is based on interviews with individuals who have left North Korea. Crucially, there is a clear limitation: all those interviewed left the country before June 2020.

Here, the facts come into conflict. The world premiere of “Squid Game” took place in September 2021.

To summarize: according to the report itself, interviews were conducted with people who fled the DPRK prior to June 2020. The series premiered in September 2021. This creates a chronological inconsistency that refutes the sensational claim of executions found in the coverage of the Amnesty International material.

Furthermore, within the Amnesty International report, claims are accompanied by caveats such as “according to witnesses” and “based on interviews.” However, in media publications, these nuances are often omitted, and the phrasing takes on a categorical tone. As a result, probabilistic assessments are perceived as established facts.

UN reports and academic studies do document restrictions on consuming foreign content and instances of public executions in the DPRK generally. However, the specific link — “teenagers + specific series + death penalty” — lacks documented cases.

To clarify just how severe the punishment for such actions actually is in the DPRK, we reached out to Korea expert Andrei Lankov, a candidate of historical sciences and professor at Kookmin University in Seoul. He confirmed that after 2015, both the country’s legislation and law enforcement practices indeed tightened. However, he has never found evidence of executions merely for watching videos:

“The new law indeed provides for the death penalty for the distribution of hostile propaganda. Simply watching does not fall under this category and does not warrant capital punishment, even theoretically.

In practice, until about 2015, the authorities turned a blind eye to the distribution of South Korean video and audio materials. Since approximately 2015, one can indeed be imprisoned for distributing and copying such content. However, I am not aware of a single credible case where people were actually shot for this,” emphasized the expert.

Previously Unconfirmed Reports of Executions in the DPRK

Limited access to information from North Korea complicates the independent verification of such reports. Given the scarcity of confirmed data, resonant claims about harsh measures are often widely disseminated in the media. In a number of cases, reports have surfaced regarding the executions of North Korean officials or cultural figures, which were subsequently unconfirmed.

A textbook example is the story of singer Hyon Song-wol. In 2013, authoritative global publications, citing the South Korean Chosun Ilbo, reported her public execution. The woman, referred to as Kim Jong-un’s “mistress,” was allegedly gunned down with machine guns in front of her fellow musicians.

But a year later, the “executed” Hyon Song-wol appeared on state television. Moreover, her career continued to flourish: in 2017, she received a post in the Party Central Committee.

The Horror Story Industry: The Specifics of Defector Testimonies

Why do such testimonies continue to appear and be replicated? The problem lies in the nature of the sources. The only window into the “black box” of the DPRK is the stories of people who have fled the country. However, this is a specific type of data that cannot be taken as the ultimate truth without cross-verification. Furthermore, testimonies from those who have left the country may be used in an information-political context, thus requiring particularly thorough verification.

Several factors can influence the reliability of such stories:

• Mind Games. Many refugees have experienced severe stress. The psychology of memory is such that, over time, personal experience mixes with rumors heard, forming false memories.

• The Information Market. South Korea officially pays for valuable information about the DPRK. Researcher Jiyoung Song notes a direct correlation: the more sensational the story, the higher the fee. This creates a dangerous incentive for exaggeration.

This information was confirmed by the expert as well. According to Andrei Lankov, the majority of those leaving the DPRK are women, approximately 15% of whom have higher or secondary specialized education. However, even for more educated North Koreans, it is difficult to adapt to a different society, so financial reward is not the only benefit they seek:

“It’s not just about the money. Invitations come in, trips happen, useful connections arise that can be transformed, say, into employment. Primarily, the people telling these stories are from the middle class, who are very few in number among those who have left the DPRK. But precisely because they are educated and can speak articulately, they understand roughly which “buttons” to push to get the most benefit.”

• Media Demand. Journalists seek drama. A story about bureaucratic difficulties interests no one, unlike a tale of executions.

In Andrei Lankov’s opinion, it is the sustained demand for shocking content that forms the fertile ground for the emergence and spread of unreliable testimonies:

“Hot sensations about the DPRK are exactly the type of stories Western and South Korean readers want to hear. For example, no one in South Korea will buy the biography of a person sitting in prison for a criminal offense in North Korea — even if unjustly. But if he invents a story that he was in the most terrible camp from which no one came out alive, but he did… and describes it in a completely fantastically delirious way, naturally, people start reading and quoting this book.”

One of the widely discussed cases confirming the need for thorough verification of such data is the bestseller “Escape from Camp 14” by Shin Dong-hyuk. His memoirs about being born in a concentration camp shocked the world, but later, under the pressure of inconsistencies, he was forced to admit that a significant part of the book about cruelty in the DPRK was fabricated. South Korean lawyer Jang Kyung-wook directly states that intelligence agencies and the media often use refugees as a propaganda tool, without caring about the accuracy of details.

A.B. Abrams, the author of “Atrocity Fabrication and Its Consequences: How Fake News Shapes World Order,” points to similar patterns with other prominent figures in the defector community who tailor their stories to Western audiences.

“Celebrity defector Park Yeonmi repeated several times that she had seen ‘my friend’s mother publicly executed. Her crime — watching a Hollywood movie,’ something which even North Korea’s harshest critics with any knowledge of the country dismissed as ridiculous,” notes Abrams.

The Logic of Demonization

To understand why these narratives persist despite frequent debunking, we turned to A.B. Abrams for further comment. He argues that the coupling of North Korea with a pop-culture phenomenon like “Squid Game” is not accidental but rather a calculated move to reinforce a geopolitical narrative.

“The use of Squid Game, as a highly praised production from South Korea, in the latest atrocity narrative, thus serves to imply a contrast between the success of the westernised state, and the depravity and slaughter in its non-westernised neighbour,” Abrams explained.

According to the expert, this fits a broader pattern where Western portrayals of the DPRK must remain uniquely negative to sustain the “dominant Western metanarrative.”

Thus, the analysis of cases like “Squid Game” shows a recurring structure: the initial source is an anonymous testimony or a story from a DPRK defector; next, the information receives institutional legitimation through human rights or research structures; after this, a broad media resonance is formed, during which the original caveats gradually disappear.

According to the observations of Korea expert Lankov, right-leaning political groups also often engage in the replication of such sensations, including by attracting the attention of human rights organizations like Amnesty International:

“Human rights organizations are often used as weapons of political struggle. Even though the human rights defenders themselves do not always realize this, they are ready to attack any authoritarian regimes, considering them the source of ‘global evil.’ At the same time, they sometimes turn a blind eye to obvious inconsistencies on the principle that ‘he is right in the main point’ and neglect such important work as fact-checking. And this is not even always directed specifically against North Korea.”

The Cost of Unverified Sensations

The story involving the Amnesty International report and the mention of “Squid Game” has sparked a discussion about information verification standards in the human rights sphere. Such stories easily take root in the information space precisely because they correspond to the pre-existing image of the country. In such conditions, critical verification of sources takes on special significance.

If unverified or controversial claims are used in such materials, it can affect the perception of both the topic itself and the organizations raising it.

Media often focus attention on flashy headlines, and discussion on social networks amplifies the resonance. At the same time, subsequent clarifications or corrections, as a rule, receive significantly less audience attention, which affects the overall information balance.

Recurring instances of data discrepancies regarding the DPRK may lower the level of audience trust in similar reports. In conditions of limited access to information, transparency of methodology and precision of wording are especially important.

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